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Abstract
We analyze the impact of electronic money competition on 
policy outcomes. We consider different assumptions regarding the 
objectives of the central bank and its ability to commit to future 
policies. Electronic money competition can discipline a revenue 
maximizing government and result in lower equilibrium inflation 
rates, even when there is imperfect commitment. The efficient 
Friedman rule is only implemented if the government maximizes 
welfare. However electronic money competition may result in the 
Friedman rule being non credible. We also show how an indepen­
dent choice of the reserve requirements can be an effective policy 
rule to enhance the disciplinary role of electronic money compe­
tition.
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Technological change in transactions, such as the development in elec­
tronic payments, is blurring the distinction between different components 
of Ml (and among components of broader monetary aggregates). Does 
competition from interest-bearing inside moneys enhance price stability? 
An answer at first glance would be yes. However, one of the reasons for 
high equilibrium inflation rates is lack of commitment. And it is not 
clear that competition can solve the time consistency problem of mone­
tary policy. In this paper we require the policy choices to be sequentially 
optimal and obtain a positive answer to the question in the title, while 
finding that competition and reputation do not reinforce each other.
Payments systems have gone through a major transformation in the 
last decade. In particular, electronic payments have risen in most devel­
oped countries and are expected to rise even more in the future. For 
example, Humphrey et al. (1996) find that ‘'in all (fourteen) developed 
countries but the United States, electronic payments have been cither 
the sole or the primary reason for the 34 percent rise in total non-cash 
payments between 1987 and 1993” ( p. 935)1. Electronic money is de­
posits that are used for transactions through electronic payments. These 
payments have a low cost. In fact the clearing is considerably less ex­
pensive than the clearing of checks (1/2 to 1/3 according to Humphrey 
at al. 1996). They are highly substitutable for currency because the pay­
ment is ultimately a liability of the card issuing bank (checks, instead, 
are a liability of the purchaser). The purchases using cash cards are 
immediately deducted from a bank account that typically pays interest. 
This distinguishes electronic money from currency. Currency by its very 
nature cannot pay nominal interest. Instead, electronic money can pay 
nominal interest on the average balance at a very low cost.
The answer to the question whether competition in providing elcc-
1 The US is the exception because a larger fraction of non-cash transactions are 
paper transactions. As it will become clear, however, out definition of "electronic 
money" is fairly broad and encompasses most non-credit, non-cash, forms of payment, 



























































































tronic money and competition between electronic money and currency 
drives down the price of money is also an empirical one. and it is tempt­
ing to relate the impressive reduction in inflation rates in the developed 
world to the generalization of electronic money as a means of payment. 
In fact most developed countries have experienced a drastic reduction of 
inflation rates in the last quarter of this century, from the double digit 
numbers of the mid-seventies to the very low -say. below 2.59J- numbers 
at the end of the nineties. High inflation episodes seem to be a problem 
of the past, as if society had become immune to the disease. This success 
in curbing inflation has usually been attributed to the major discipline, 
in terms of monetary policy, of more independent central banks and. in 
the case of the European Union, the design and willingness to comply 
with the Maastricht Treaty have received most of the credit. But maybe, 
the right incentives for monetary discipline have been created by the 
widespread development and use of cash substitutes.
The close substitutability of cash cards with currency makes this 
world with electronic money resemble a free banking world, i.e.. the his­
torical episodes of relatively unrestricted banking systems, as the "Free 
Banking Era" in the United States (1837-63). Scotland (1716-1844), New 
England (1820-1860). Canada (1817-1914) and other historical experiences2 
In most cases, these episodes preceded the introduction of legal restric­
tions preventing the competition of privately issued bank notes. More 
recently, in many countries steps have been taken to liberalize financial 
services. But. more than to a pursuit of laissez-faire, the rise in electronic 
money is due to a technological change (not suppressed by regulations) 
which makes it possible for households and firms to consolidate their cash 
and deposits portfolios.
The issue of currencies competing in rates of return has also been 
addressed by an extensive literature3 that focused on the currency sub­
2See Schuler (1992) for an account of historical episodes of free banking. See also 
Dowd (1992) and. in particular, the scholarly editorial work of W hite (1993) for a 
broad perspective of the literature on free banking: to which one must necessarily 
add the writings of Hayek (1974.1978).
3For a survey of the main results and the policy implications see Calvo and Vegli 




























































































stitution experiences of high inflation countries. In those models govern­
ment policies are exogenous.
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework to study the effects 
of electronic money competition —or. more generally, competition front 
interest-bearing inside monies. In particular, we study the relationship 
between competition and policy outcomes under different assumptions 
regarding the objectives of the central bank, the ability of the monetary 
authorities to commit to future policies, and the legal restrictions -in the 
form of reserve requirements- on financial intermediaries. The contribu­
tion of this paper is to show how these differences affect the way in which 
electronic money competition disciplines monetary authorities.
In interpreting the high inflation rates of the late seventies and early 
eighties, the literature emphasized the time inconsistency problem associ­
ated with monetary policy. Models with reputation have been developed 
to analyze this problem and some of the policy recommendations, like 
central bank independence, can be understood along these lines. The 
time-inconsistency problem in implementing monetary policies is well 
understood.
What is less clear is whether competition can help to overcome 
this problem, or whether it may even worsen it. In other words, the 
role of competition cannot be analyzed independently from the commit­
ment problem. While we have begun to understand how policies can 
be designed in environments without full commitment (see, for example, 
Chang (1990). Chari & Kehoe (1990), Ireland (1991), Stokey, 1991), with 
-in part- the exception of Taub (1985) the “currency competition” argu­
ment has abstracted from the reputational problem4. This is the central 
theme of this paper.
In our model, “reputation” and “competition” are two disciplinary 
mechanisms that, as it turns out, do not always complement each other. 
To better understand this interplay, we study two contrasting hypothesis 
regarding the objectives of the central bank. First (in Sections 3, d and
Urilic (1997).




























































































5) we assume a ‘ revenue maximizing" central bank, second (in Section 6) 
a ‘‘representative” central bank: that is. a central bank which shares the 
same preferences as the representative household. The later hypothesis 
dominates the current academic literature on monetary policy design and 
is attractive to central bank economists. However, it is not clear which 
hypothesis is a better description of reality, and. therefore, we analyze 
both (leaving to the reader the exercise of taking convex combinations).
In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we show how 
“electronic money" helps to curb down inflation when the government is 
a revenue maximizer. In the world with electronic money, the presence of 
money-issuing competitive banks drives the intermediation gains to the 
marginal intermediation cost. Inflation under full commitment is driven 
down as a result of competition between the issuer of currency and the 
anonymous suppliers of inside money, together with the reduction of 
financial intermediation costs.
In Section 4 we study the non-commitment case. The rent-seeking 
commitment policy is time inconsistent, but in considering default, the 
central bank must take into account that agents may move to electronic 
money (i.e.. depriving the central bank of future seignorage rents). It 
turns out that, as long as there is no deflation under the full commitment 
policy, such a policy can be sustained by reputation. An odd feature of 
this result is that to sustain the full commitment policy, the financial 
intermediation sector cannot be too efficient. The interest rate spread 
between bonds and money must guarantee non-negative future rents to 
the central bank.
However, reserve requirements affect this spread. This, on the one 
hand, means that if reserve requirements are determined outside the 
central bank, they can be used as an effective policy instrument; but, on 
the other hand, it also means that if they are determined by the same 
central bank then the positive role of competition can be undermined. 
We analyze this in Section 3.
In Section 6 we study the case of a “representative" government. 
Not surprisingly, under perfect commitment, the Friedman rule is the pol­




























































































there is no role for ‘ electronic money” competition.
However, the Ramsey solution is time-inconsistent and. therefore, 
with imperfect commitment, the government must balance the gains of 
deviating from the prescribed Friedman rule, against the costs of a devi­
ation. After a deviation, households do not use cash. When cash is the 
only liquid asset, this autarchic outcome is most undesired by the "rc|>- 
resentative” government. In contrast, the "punishment” is less severe 
when households can still use electronic money. As a result, the presence 
of electronic money competition makes the “reputation" disciplinary ef­
fect less effective. We show, however, that if agents cannot adjust their 
portfolios instantaneously, a benevolent government might be deterred 
from deviating and might implement the Friedman rule, in spite of the 
lack of commitment and the presence of electronic money competition. 
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Monetary competitive equilibria
In this section we characterize competitive equilibria in which trans­
actions are performed with currency and electronic money. Electronic 
money is interest bearing deposits that are liquid because they can be 
used for transactions, through the use of electronic debit cards. Thus it 
is a close substitute for currency.
The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely 
lived households, financial intermediaries and a government. The house­
holds have preferences given by V
V =  + u(c?) + ah,} (1)
1=0
where cj,c? and h, represent, respectively, consumption of a cash good, 
consumption of a credit good and leisure in period t. Assuming that 
leisure enters linearly in the utility function is in no way essential, but 
significantly simplifies the derivations. The utility function u shares the 




























































































The representative household chooses sequences of consumption of 
goods and leisure {c,1. t f . h, } ^ 0 and sequences of assets j  M/+\. 6{'+1. E,+11 .
given sequences of prices, {P (. ,. /,'+, } . to satisfy the following
budget and cash-in advance constraints:
MM +P,yt+l + EM  < Alt + P<Rbtbt + Ict E, -  P,(cl + cf) + P,(l 1 > 0
( 2 )
Ptc\ < M, + Et. t > 0 (3)
where Mo, R^a■ all(l IqEo are given and a no-Ponzi games condition is 
satisfied. The variable denotes the number of units of the produced 
good, in period t, that entitle the household to Rl+ib>,'+] units of the 
produced good in period t +  1. Mt+\ is end of period currency held from 
period t to t + 1. Et+1 is the electronic money. Currency and electronic 
money are perfect substitutes. I}+1 is the nominal rate of return on 
these deposits. 1 — /i, is the labor supply and P, is the price level. The 
particular timing is the one in Svensson (1985). meaning that the agents 
enter the period with money balances that are used for transactions that 
same period.
Since currency does not pay nominal interest, a competitive equi­
librium where both currency and electronic money circulate must have 
7f = 1. We define
Ibt+l =  < > 0  (4)
Then an equilibrium in this economy must also satisfy:








(7)< i  =  r \
if i[ < 1, only currency circulates and (5) - (7) must hold. If instead 
n  > i, then equation (5) is replaced by




























































































meaning that the cost of holding money is only the difference between 
the return on bonds and the return on money that in this case is not 
zero.
Financial intermediaries The financial intermediaries hold govern­
ment bonds. Ptbrl+l. and issue interest bearing deposits that can be used 
for purchases. Et+\. through the use of electronic debit cards. There is an 
intermediation cost measured in units of labor, rtf. We assume that the 
financial intermediaries operate a Leontieff-fixed coefficients technology 
that produces electronic money and uses as inputs bonds and labor. The 
total amount of electronic money equals the amount of bonds held and 
equals P, ̂ - where 6 is the labor cost of one unit of deposits:
Government The government issues money, A/(s+1, and real debt,, d( + 1, 
to finance government expenditures, gt. Government expendit ures arc a 
credit good. We abstract from alternative sources of tax revenues so that 
the government budget constraints are
The cash flow of the financial intermediaries, in period I, is
CF; =  El+i -  P,b‘l+l -  EJ\ 4- Ptlf,Rht -  Ptn\. I > 0 (9)
The zero-profit condition is
( 10)
A/*+1 4- Ptdt+\ < M ’  4- P, R^dt 4- P(ft. 1 ^ 0 
The present value budget constraint can be written as
( 11)
(12)




























































































Market clearing The market clearing conditions arc
c! + cf + y, = 1 -  h, -  . t > 0
• t
(13)
dt — b̂  + bct . t ^ 0 
AI, = AI’ . t >  0
( 11 )
The competitive equilibrium where both currency and electronic money 
circulate must satisfy:
In this equilibrium the real values of currency and electronic money 
are indeterminate. Therefore the level of government expenditures is also 
indeterminate. For the utility function that is linear in leisure, consump­
tion is determinate but leisure is not. To abstract from this indeterminacy 
we assume that when the cost of holding the two types of money is equal, 
the households opt for currency.
If I, > 1. only electronic money circulates. The price level and 
the nominal interest rates are indeterminate. The real variables are not 
affected by the multiplicity in the price levels and the nominal interest 
rates.
In these economies with private issuers of electronic money, the 
nominal interest rates are not driven down to zero. The reason is that 
private issuance of electronic money is compatible with interest payments 
on money, whereas that literature tended to exclude this possibility. Free 
entry into this market drives the spread between the rate on bonds and 
the rate on electronic money down to the cost of supplying the monetary 
substitutes. Competition between electronic money and currency can 
itself drive down the interest rates, as will be shown in the next section.
3 Equilibria with commitment
In this section we consider full commitment optimal policies under the 





























































































that the government preferences are described by an objective function
Y .3 ‘G(gt)
(= 0
where, for standard reasons, the function G is assumed to be increasing 
and concave. The government maximizes this function subject to the 
budget constraint and subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions 
by choice of {A/,', dt, g ,}Z 0 ■
First, note from equation (7) that the equilibrium real rate of in­
terest is constant5. Using this result together with (4), (5) and (6) to 
eliminate prices in the government budget constraint (12) we obtain the 
following implementability constraint
I y g t  =  -  1 W +J) -  j r  -  Rodo
t—0 <=o 1o
where F  is real demand for currency. If the government chooses , <
1 + 8. so that only currency circulates, then F  = A/, where M  is the
function obtained from the first order condition — = /,+,, so that
ci+i =  m<+i =  A /(/f+i). If instead Ib,+\ > 1  + 9, then F (Ib+l) =  0. The
government maximizes revenues by setting the monetary policy so that,
Mi — o 
Po U -
Given that G is assumed to be strictly concave and that the dis­
count factor of the government is equal to the real interest rate, the 
government’s problem can be simplified as the choice of a sequence of 
nominal interest rates that maximizes
OC
g =  (i -  -  n m 'v . )  -  (i -  /?)/& /o (i7)
(= 0
If in the objective function we replace the function F  for A/ so that 
there are no constraints on the choice of the nominal interest rates arising
5Tliis results from the linear structure of the utility function. Note that this 





























































































from competition with electronic money, the solution is stationary anti 
corresponds to the maximum of the Laffer curve. /*” . For the isoelastic 
utility function. u(c) =  with a < 1. as l b+l becomes arbitrarily
large, the revenue (/J’+1 -  1 )A /(/f+1) tends to zero. Also when /{’+1 = 1. 
the revenue is zero. The maximum of the Laffer curve corresponds to a 
positive, finite value for the interest rate. We assume that the preferences 
specification is such that the value Ib' is higher than 1 + 0. This means 
that the revenue maximizer government would not choose an interest rate 
lower than that value. Should the government choose /* ., > 1+0? In this 
case the revenue is zero. So the government will choose Ibt+l =  1 +0. for all 
t > 0. and raise 0F(1 + 0) of seigniorage revenue, per period. Since from 
the zero profit condition for the financial intermediaries Ib+l =  7f+] + 0. 
it must be that 7*+1 =  1. We have shown that the following proposition 
holds:
Proposition 1 Assume Ib* > 1+0, where Il“  maximizes (Ib — l )M (Ih). 
Then the commitment solution for the revenue maximizing government 
is 7f+1 =  1 + 0 . and 7f+1 =  1, for all t > 0.
Electronic money drives the nominal interest rates to levels that 
only account for the intermediation cost. i.c. the cost of providing the 
alternative means of transactions to the households. In an environment 
without electronic money, the government would set the monetary policy 
so that the maximum revenue may be obtained. This would mean that 
the interest rate would be Ib‘ , and the revenues would be g =  —
1 )F(76')  — (1 -  0)R^do- Since government revenues are assumed to be 
worthless, the presence of electronic money is welfare improving.
Would the same result be obtained if regulation prevented the banks 
from paying interest on electronic-money? Apparently yes, since the 
resulting equilibrium is precisely zero interest on electronic-money. In 
fact no. since it is assumed, that for equal prices the private agents opt 
for the government currency. If banks could not pay a higher return 
on electronic-money than on currency, then the central bank is free to 




























































































The optimal commitment solution is time inconsistent. In this so­
lution. at time zero, the government decides to hold real bonds issued by 
the private sector that are exchanged for money and the gross nominal 
interest rate is constant over time and set at 1 + 0. At time I. if the gov­
ernment could revise the plan, the problem would be to choose |/|j+, j 
to maximize
S=t
i)F (/.6+i) -  O -  0) Pt
+ .r 'd , ( 18)
where g‘ are the government expenditures from period t on. The optimal 
policy is to set the price level at time t arbitrarily large. This way 
the government reduces the real value of the nominal liabilities. So the 
interest rate plan for Ibt =  jpf— — 1 + 8  would not be optimal, for a 
government that could decide sequentially.
The discussion above suggests that lack of commitment can dras­
tically change the nature of currency competition. In fact, the govern­
mental agency that issues currency competes with the private issuers of 
money by announcing an interest rate. However, as was shown above, the 
equilibrium nominal interest rates, under commitment, are not time con­
sistent and therefore those announcements make no sense. As a result, 
one could be led to think that an equilibrium with electronic money-only 
would be the sole sequential equilibrium outcome. In fact this is not the 
case. The credible threat of reversion to an equilibrium where currency 
does not circulate might be enough to sustain the equilibrium solution 
under commitment that was just described.
This means that currency competition when there is at least, one 
big player, that can influence the price level, is of a very different nature 
from competition under commitment. In Section 1, we determine the 
sequential equilibria in an environment where the government precisely 




























































































4 Equilibria without commitment
As it is clear from the discussion in the last section, the government 
policies are not time consistent. Thus, in this section we consider repu­
tational equilibria where the competitive households and financial inter­
mediaries condition their decisions on the contemporaneous histories of 
government policies. This framework naturally drives the analysis to the 
interactions between competition and reputation.
Once we allow expectations of the agents to depend on histories, 
there is always an equilibrium where only electronic money circulates. 
This equilibrium is time consistent. The households expect that the 
return on electronic money is higher than the one on currency. Ihs+1 > 1 + 
6, s > t, and the real value of currency they decide to hold is equal to zero. 
Given this the demand for real balances is zero and any monetary policy 
is optimal. In particular, having a monetary policy of high interest rates, 
consistent with agents' expectations, is a best reply for the government . 
Since F(/£+1) = 0, s > t, and ^  =  0, then the value of this equilibrium 
outcome is
y W S E  =  _ ( !  _  0 ) R b(it
where W'SE stands for worst sequential equilibrium. We do show now 
that this is indeed the worst.
Note that a feasible policy for the government, at any time is to 
follow a constant money rule. Under these conditions there are two sta­
tionary equilibria, one where prices are finite and constant, and another 
one where the real balances are zero. There may also be other equilibria 
where the price level grows without bound. In any of these equilibria, 
either F(l)  is zero or it is positive and /, > 1. The value for the govern­
ment is given by (17). Every term in the summation on the right hand 
side is either positive or zero. In this case, independently of what the 
private agents' optimal response is, the government can achieve, at least 
the value Vtn sh. In the language of game theory, this is the reservation 
value (ininimax strategy) for the government. Therefore, there cannot 




























































































The above argument shows that a monetary policy where, following 
an arbitrary increase of the price level (say. to infinity), interest rates are 
high enough, consistent with private sector's beliefs, and cash is not held, 
is a Nash equilibrium. To define a policy, resulting in a sub-game per­
fect (and sequential) equilibrium, we must define how the government 
will behave in the -zero probability- event that some agents demand 
cash anyway. In such case, we postulate that the revenue maximizing 
government will set the price arbitrarily large (defaulting, again, on out­
standing liabilities) and setting interest rates, after that, as to have cash 
(asset) return dominated by electronic money. Notice that in such a 
-zero probability- path, interest rates become arbitrarily large too.
In the tradition of Barro and Gordon (1983) and in line with Chari 
and Kehoe(1990), Stokey (1991). Ireland (1994) and Chang (1996). we 
apply Abreu (1988)’s optimal penal codes and use the reversion to the 
worst sequential equilibrium as the means of supporting equilibrium out­
comes. The value of the worst sequential equilibrium outcome is com­
pared to the value of the revenue maximizing equilibrium (RME)  out­
come,
y R U E  =  ^ ( / 6 _  ] ) a / ( / 6 }  _  ( 1  _  / ? )  ( * / ( / * )  +  / ? ' / , / , )
where Ib = 1 +  8. The RAIE equilibrium path can be supported as a 
sequential equilibrium when its value is higher then the one of t lie W 'SE. 
This is true when
7T > 0
meaning that the government has to get a positive gain from issuing 
money. The proposition follows:
Proposition 2 The optimal policy under commitment is a sequential 
equilibrium path if the intermediation cost, 0. is large enough that the 
equilibrium inflation rate is non-negative.
Proof. It was shown above that the optimal policy under commitment 
is a sequential equilibrium whenever 7r > 0. This means that l 1’ > [ Ï  1. 




























































































This result is not surprising if you think of seigniorage revenue 
accounting. The total seigniorage revenue can be split in two parts: the 
gains from lending out the real quantity of money (at the real interest 
rate) plus the gains from issuing new money (the inflation rate). If the 
government defaults, the outstanding balances are valueless and there are 
no future seigniorage revenues. If instead, there is no default, then the 
gains are just the ones from future issuance of money. As long as these 
are positive, meaning that the inflation rate is positive, it is optimal for 
the central bank to stay in business.
In a world without electronic money, the commitment solution 
would be to set the nominal interest rate so that the maximum of the 
Laffer curve is obtained. As long as this value is positive, the equilib­
rium is sequential. In this case, the punishment is autarchy, but from 
the perspective of a revenue maximizing government, this has the same 
value as the electronic money-only equilibrium.
One could think that competition with electronic money would 
drive the nominal interest rates to values that could not be sustained, 
because the opportunity cost of defaulting would be substantially re­
duced. This is partially true. Competition with electronic money drives 
the inflation tax to a low level under commitment, but this solution is a 
sequential equilibrium provided the intermediation cost is big enough, to 
guarantee the benefits from the future issuing of currency.
If the commitment solution is not a sequential equilibrium then 
the only sequential equilibrium path is the equilibrium without currency. 
However since currency is replaced bv electronic money this "autarchic” 
solution may not be such a great disaster. In the way we have modelled 
money, there is a liquidity effect so that the switch to electronic money 
implies the destruction of the real value of liquid assets and so the cash 
good is not consumed in that period. However from the following pe­
riod on the households would be using electronic money as the means of 
exchange, supporting the cost of intermediation.
We have seen that the requirement for the commitment solution 
to be sequential is that the intermediation costs are not too low. One 




























































































serve requirements. That way competition with electronic money is made 
softer and so the revenues from issuing money may be increased to the 
point that the revenue maximizing government is not interested in de­
faulting. In the next section we analyze the effects of considering reserve 
requirements, for the equilibria with and without commitment.
5 Reserve requirements
Reserve requirements can be understood as a technological constraint 
or instead as a legal requirement. We assume that, as it is in most 
cases, legal requirements on idle reserves are a fraction of total deposits. 
Therefore every bank faces a fixed coefficients technology with deposits, 
labor input and reserves, such that
(1 -  z)Et+i = Ptb't+i
Z|+i =  zEt+\
Ptn\ = 0Et
where Z,+) are reserves and 2 is the linear reserve requirement. In period 
t, the cash flow of the financial intermediaries is
CF(' = F(+i -  Ptbet+l - Z l+1-  E,l\ + P,b\ /?;' + Zt -  0E„ t > 0 (19)
The zero profit condition is therefore
Ibt+ i~ n + i = 0 + z ( I bt+l - \ ) , t > 0  (20)
The government budget constraint is not affected by the presence of 
the reserve requirements, but the government money supply must now, 
in equilibrium, be equal to the demand by the households and by the 
financial intermediaries.




























































































The competitive equilibrium where both currency arid electronic money 
can circulate must now satisfy:
l bi+i (22)
The government budget constraint can be written as
oc oc M  7
< I > + ,( / î+, -  i )F ( / ‘+1) -  9 2  -  f  -  fljrfo
(=o 1=0 r 0 r 0
(23)
where F is the real demand for currency and reserves. If the government 
chooses I bt+ 1 < 1 +  so that only currency circulates, then again 
F =  M, where M is the function m(+1 =  M (I b+l), obtained from the 
first order condition u =  /b+1. If instead / 6(+1 > 1 +  , then,
using (20),
F(I?+ l) =  z A I ( \ + 6  +  z(Ibt+i -  1)).
Note first that reserve requirements do not change the nature of the 
problem concerning the period zero balances. Therefore, the government 
maximizes revenues In netting the monetary policy so that — j?  — 0 
. The government s problem can be simplified as the choice of a sequence 
of nominal interest rates that maximizes
9 =  (1 -  13) £ / ? ' +1( /m  -  1)F(l!+i) -  (1 -  0)R bo<lo (24)
1=0
If the reserve requirement, z, is taken to be exogenous, there are 
three types of solutions. First, if the intermediation cost, 6, is very low, 
eventually zero, then, for currency to circulate, the nominal interest rate 
must be very low. Therefore, the government cannot get almost any 
seigniorage revenue from currency. In this case, the solution is to set 
a nominal interest rate such that only electronic money circulates, and 
that maximizes the seigniorage imposed on reserve requirements, the 
only demand for currency in the equilibrium. Therefore, the government 
maximizes




























































































This means that the choice of the nominal interest rate is Ih = /> 
where Ib’ is the interest rate that maximizes the Laffer curve, defined as 
(Ib-  1 )M (Ib).
A second possible solution can occur for intermediate values of 9 
and z. This is a case in which the maximum of the Laffer curve is to the 
right of 1 +  j— ■ Thus, electronic money does impose an upper bound 
on the nominal interest rate. However, the government is better oil In- 
imposing a low- relative to the maximum of the Laffer curve -interest 
rate but having a larger tax base, rather than imposing a higher interest 
rate but collecting the tax on a fraction of the money in circulation. In 
this case, the solution is the corner Ib =  1 +  y^ . Here only currency 
circulates, as well.
Finally, if 0 and z are high enough, it might be that Ib" < 1 4- y^r. 
in which case Ib" will be the solution, and only currency circulates. The 
value of this solution is g =  fl(Ib’ — l)A /(/'” ) -  (1 — In this case, 
the intermediation costs combined with the reserve requirements imply 
that electronic money cannot compete with currency.
If the same agency that picks the inflation tax also determines the 
reserve requirements, then the optimal solution is to set z. so that
In this case the government gets the revenue corresponding to the maxi­
mum of the Laffer curve and only currency circulates6.
The presence of reserve requirements, bv forcing the banks to hold 
non-interest bearing assets, has the effect of softening the competition 
with electronic money. In the extreme case of a 100% reserve require­
ment. electronic money competition is killed.
Note that with reserve requirements, the condition for currency to 
dominate electronic money becomes
6lf the intermediation cost was zero then this solution could he reproduced by 




























































































l b < 1 +
e
I -  c
Therefore, from the viewpoint of the government, an economy with inter­
mediation costs equal to 6 and reserve requirements equal to c is equiva­
lent to an economy without reserve requirements and an intermediation 
cost equal to
The solution with an endogenous reserve requirement corresponds to the 
maximum of the Laffer curve so it is equivalent to the solution without 
electronic money. In that case the non-committed government is able to 
sustain a high level of the inflation tax.
For any exogenous level of the reserve requirement, if the commit­
ment equilibrium is such that only currency circulates, then the punish­
ment is to revert to electronic money but with arbitrarily large nominal 
interest rates so that the solution is autarchy. So for the revenue maxi­
mizing government the effect of the reserve requirements is to raise the 
value of the equilibria under commitment, improving the conditions for 
sustainability of the equilibria. This result is summarized in the following 
proposition:
Proposition 3 Whenever 0 < fl~l — 1. it is possible to sustain an 
equilibrium solution under commitment if the reserve requirements are. 
high enough, as long as the inflation rate that maximizes the Laffer curve 
is non-negative.
Proof. Let the reserve requirement c be such that 1 +  ■—  = If 
the inflation rate that maximizes the Laffer curve is non-negative, the 
equilibrium under commitment for the interest rate must be l h > 
since the government can at least get the revenues from the currency-only 
equilibrium with I1' — fl~1. As we showed in the previous proposition, 




























































































inflation rate is non-negative, i.e Ib > 3~l. Since the case where Ih > d _1 
must correspond to higher revenues, the equilibrium under commitment 
is sustainable ■
5.0.1 Reserve requirements as a policy tool
Reserve requirements can act as a means of guaranteeing the sustainabil­
ity of the commitment solution for the revenue maximizing government . 
If the commitment solution is not sustainable the solution will be the 
autarchic equilibrium that is a sequential equilibrium. In terms of wel­
fare in this case with reserve requirements the punishment is very severe, 
since the households can reduce the revenues to the government only 
by driving electronic money out of circulation. The households would 
be better off paying the inflation tax that brings the highest revenue to 
the government. The endogeneity of the reserve requirement, softens the 
asymmetry of the punishment to the households and to the government 
since it would be an off-equilibrium outcome.
An obvious policy recommendation is the careful and independent 
use of the reserve requirement instrument its a means of obtaining sus­
tainability of the revenue maximizing, commitment solution.
6 The case of a “representative” govern­
ment
Jn this section we briefly show how the results change when we assume 
that the government maximizes the utility function of the consumers. 
The standard Ramsey problem assumes fixed government expenditures. 
As the ability to collect seigniorage will be limited by the efficiency of the 
financial intermediaries, we allow the government to levy consumption 
taxes, Tv, to ensure that expenditures can be financed. As we will see, 
a “representative" government with full commitment, will obey optimal 
taxation principles and implement t he Friedman principle of zero nominal 




























































































more the first period cash good by increasing the initial price level (as we 
will see, whether or not the government wants to do this, depends on the 
price elasticity of the consumption good). This is the basis of the time 
inconsistency of the optimal monetary policy. Before analyzing policies 
without full commitment, we must characterize equilibria with electronic 
motley and the Ramsey -full commitment- solution.
rite consumer's problem is as before, except for the presence of a 
tax on consumption. Thus, preferences are represented by
r  =  f \ f ‘ |U(c,1) +  u(t j ) +  a h ,]
1=0
We simplify the analysis of this section bv assuming Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion (C'RRA). That is, — — o, where Mn is the price
elasticity of c,. For simplicity we also assume that <7 < 1 The budget 
and cash-in-advance constraints are
AR+i + Pi î+i + £<( + 1 < Pt(l ~ l*t) — (1 + Ti)l>t(c] +  cf) + Mi +Pi R',l>',' + I', Ei
(25)
(1 + T{)ptcj < Alt + Ei (2(>)
It follows that the solution of the households problem must -(-sat­
isfy:
l> ,= l3 'K 'n  (27)
where A, is the lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint 
(25), and
1 + 7< = t > 0 (28)
Q
Furthermore, if //+1 < 1,
f h W'(Cl'+l) 
'+1 «'(<?+,)
/ > 0 (29)
while if If+, > 1 .
" ' ( , '+l) -  H  /'' V 
1+1 ,+l =  ( ! + » )
t >  0 (30)





























































































6.1 O ptim al policy under com m itm ent
The solution under commitment is a Ramsey (1927) optimal taxation 
problem, in the line developed by Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari. 
Christiano and Kehoe (1993): as them, vve follow the -so called primal 
approach. The objective of the government is to maximize the welfare 
of the representative household, subject to feasibility and competitive 
equilibrium constraints: in the primal approach, these competitive equi­
librium constraints are consolidated in a unique implement ability con­
straint.
More precisely, consider first the case where A+i < 1. which means 
that only currency circulates. In order to eliminate prices, we substitute 
(2 .). (28), (29) and (26) into (25) (pie-multiplied bv A a n d  obtain 
the following consolidated condition
0u'ict+i)ct+i + u'(cf)ct ~ «(1 -  M  + rtk'i'+i -  «bj'd-1 = 0 (31)
Now. if we add the discounted restrictions (31). imposing appropriate 
terminal conditions, we obtain the implemcntability constraint
u'(co)co- q(1 -ho) + abol3~l +Y ^ 0 ,[u'(,c't)cit +u\cj)cf-o(\ — //, )J = 0
t=\
(32)
We can now define the Ramsey problem as
OC
max^/3'[u(c(') + u(cf) -  n(l -  /i,)j
t=0
subject to (32) and
4  + t f  + /7 - ( 1  - / h ) < «  (33)
Let 7  > 0 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the imple­
mcntability constraint (32). The following equations characterize the 
Ramsey equilibrium, and show the time inconsistency problem when the 
price elasticity is different from one (sec Nicolini, 19977), 
i.’tr-1 t 1 +  7(1 -  a ),h _  » '( f,<Vi)
'41 u'irh ) 1 + 7 ( 1 -  a)
= 1 / > 0 (31)

































































































1 + 7(1 -  <r)
1 +  ■)
1 + ->(1 -  a) t > 0
(36)
It follows that the solution of the Ramsey policy is the Friedman rule 
and the corresponding equilibrium is stationary from period one on In 
the context of optimal taxation rules, the Friedman rule means that the 
two goods, cash and credit, are taxed at the same rate. This is the 
optimal solution since the utility function is homothetic in the two goods 
and separable in leisure. These are the conditions for uniform taxation 
of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), as pointed out by Lucas and Stokey 
(1983) and Chari. Christiano and Kelioe (1993). Furthermore, if the 
price elasticity is greater than one (a < 1), the consumption in period 0 
of the cash good is lower than the consumption from period 1 on. That 
is, there is a higher tax on the initial cash good (with a price elasticity 
of one). In summary,
Proposition 4 Assume CRRA. In a Ramsey equilibrium. Ij’+I = 1 anti 
t, = t . t > 0. If a < 1 cl < eg = cg+1 =  c ‘+1, t > 0.
This solution is an equilibrium even if electronic money is a liq­
uid asset since the zero profit condition implies that /,r+1 = //'+1 — 0, 
I > 0. and, since 6 > 0, the currency printed by the government domi­
nates in rate of ret urn electronic money when the government implements 
the Ramsey policy: in particular, the nominal interest rate on electronic 
money is negative. The last argument also shows that there can not be 
a Ramsey equilibrium in which households only use electronic money (if 
private financial intermediation is more costly than central bank inter­
mediation) as stated in the following corollary
Corollary 5 When 6 > 0, the. Ramsey solution is such that / ;+. < i. 
t > 0. so that electronic money does not circulate.
Suppose that there was an equilibrium with I'l+I > 1, then =




























































































could have been achieved by the “representative government" (in the 
previous case of 7(e+1 < 1), by setting / (fc+1 =  1 + 0 .  in which case the 
government would have collected seignorage revenues. As we have seen, 
with constant elasticity, the government chooses not to impose such a 
distortion and has less incentive to do so when there are no revenues, as 
it is the case when agents only use electronic money.
With full commitment, the "representative government" can cred­
ibly guarantee that If =  /* — 6 <  1 and. therefore, he always chooses to 
ex' icise this option. That is. with full commitment the analysis of the 
Ramsey problem reduces to the case, analyzed above, of AV. < i
6.2 O ptim al policy w ithout com m itm ent
As we have seen, if a < 1, the Ramsey solution is time inconsistent, 
meaning that money is printed at a rate higher than the one consistent 
with Friedman rule. Nevertheless, if deviating from such path is costly 
enough for the “representative” government, then it may be a sequential 
equilibrium path; that is, it may be a credible policy. We now study 
under which conditions the Friedman rule is credible.
Proceeding as we have done in Section 1. with the revenue maxi­
mizing government, we characterize -for the representative government- 
the worst sequential equilibrium that can follow a deviation and compare 
this path with the Ramsey -Friedman rule- path.
Suppose that the government has been following the Ramsey pol­
icy tip to period t. and that its current liabilities in real terms- arc 
consistent with the Ramsey policy being kept forever say, </,. Suppose, 
furthermore, that if in period t >  1, the government deviates from the 
Ramsey policy, bv increasing the price level, the private sector reacts im­
mediately and currency is driven out of circulation since only electronic 
money is demanded This results in an arbitrarily large price level. This 
also means that the real value of the outstanding electronic money is also 
made arbitrarily low. As a result, the households are unable to consume 




























































































demands electronic money, to set an arbitrarily large price is a best re­
sponse for the government, as it is for individual private agents not to 
demand cash after a currency collapse (i.e.. the deviation path is Nash 
and in the language of Chari and Kehoe- sustainable). Furthermore, if 
the government policy states that in the event that some private agents 
demand cash, then it will set prices according to the myopic (period 
zero) policy (and not according the Friedman rule), then the equilibrium 
is sul>-garne perfect, hence -in this context- sequential8 *.
To characterize the worst sequential equilibrium, let be the 
value, to the representative government, of the path following a deviation 
in period t. Since there is no consumption of the cash good (i.e.. there 
is a currency crunch), we have that
Vtw =  u(0) + u(c(r” ')) + ah,(T"') +  0H 'h'(th') 
where the following period value, U "  (r "  ) takes the form
ll '11 (r) =  [u(c(t)) + u(c0{t)) + nhg(r)\/( 1 -  3).
Given a tax rate r, consumptions and labor supplies satisfy:
u'(c(t)) =  a(\ + t) (37)
u'(c0(t )) =  n (l + t )(1 + 0) 
ht(T) =  1 -  (c(r) 4- g)
and
M t) =  1 -  (c(t) + (1 + d)cg(r) + g)
Finally, the tax rate r "  must satisfy
g =  i3r" c0(t"  ) + r 1’ c (r "  ) -  (1 -  3)dt (38) 
Similarly, we can compute the value of the Ramsey path at t >  1,
V/' =  2i/(c(r")) +  o h (rH) +  fl\YR(TR)
8See Benhahih et «7.(1997) for a similar characterization of credible policies (notice,





























































































U'R(r) = [2u(c(r)) + o/t(r)]/(l -  0)
and. given a tax rate r. consumptions and labor supplies must satisfy 
(37) and
/i(r) = 1 -  (2c(r) + g)
Finallv. in order to compute the “Ramsey tax" tr we need to know 
the consumption of the cash good and labor supply in period zero: 
co(r), H0(t). They are given by
u 'M 1"))
q (1 + t)it 
1 (1 - f f ) ( l  + t)
(39)
and
h0(r) = 1 -  (co(r) + c(t) + g)
It follows that the consumption tax of the Ramsey solution is the value 
th that satisfies
g =  /?rw2c(rw) + ( l —/?)rfl(co(rR)+ e (rR) ) - ( l —/3)((l+TK)co(7-', )+f/0;? ’ )
Notice that one can account for the possible interest of the “repre­
sentative government” in deviating in period t by comparing the resulting 
budgets in that period. As we have just seen, the budget corresponding 
to the worst sequential equilibrium path is (38), i.e.
g =  0TPCo(Tl>) + Tnr(Tn) -  (1 -  0)d,li ' 
while the present value budget of following the Ramsey path is
9 = 2tiic(ti>) -  (1 -  0)(\ + r " )c (r " )  -  (1 -  0)0,0  1 (10)
There arc three differences between (38) and (10). The first, is lhat 
cg(rD) shows up instead of c (rR). This reflects the fact that after a de­
viation, consumers use electronic money to buy the cash good, which is 
dominated by currency at. the Ramsey equilibrium. Therefore, consump­




























































































solution. Note that this means that as the tax base will be lower, the tax 
rate must be higher, everything else constant. The second is that since, 
after a deviation, there is a -one period liquidity crunch, the govern­
ment cannot collect consumption taxes from the cash good in the period 
t. Thus, the value of the tax revenues is discounted by J. This also means 
that' the tax base is lower, such that everything else constant, the tax 
must be higher. Finally, the third difference is that the second term in 
the right-hand-side of (-40) is not present in (38). This is precisely the 
benefit of the deviation, the destruction of the real value of outstanding 
currency. In this case, everything else constant, the after deviation tax 
must be lower. Note that if the t wo first effects dominate, the tax after a 
deviation is higher than the Ratnsey tax. so a deviation lowers the utility 
of the government, which means that the Ramsey allocation is sustain­
able. An example is when /? is made arbitrarily close to one. Then, it 
must be that th < r l>, with equality when 0 is made arbitrarily close to 
zero. In the case of equality, the value of the deviation is lower than the 
value of the Ramsey solution because of the liquidity crunch.
When the gains from the initial destruction of real liabilities are 
enough to induce r fi > r ° ,  then this effect must be compared with the 
costs of making the consumption of the cash good too low -  the liquidity 
crunch-, as well as the waste in resources from using electronic money 
in transactions rather than using the more efficient currency. If the costs 
outweigh the benefits, VtH >  \ '/(u , the Ramsey solution is a sequential 
equilibrium path. In particular, the Friedman rule is sustainable if the 
discount factor and the intermediation costs are not too low and the 
liquidity crunch factor, from having u(0) instead of i/(c(r,i), results in a 
severe loss of utility.
Reserve requirements have no effect on the Ramsey solution. This 
solution is the Friedman rule and electronic money docs not circulate. 
However, the presence of the reserve requirements can increase the pun­
ishment, to the disutility of autarchy, since this would be an equilibrium 
with an arbitrarily large nominal interest rate. This would help sustain 
the commitment solution.




























































































reduces the punishment of a deviation and therefore makes it harder to 
sustain the optimal solution. However, the punishment might still be 
severe enough, so that the Friedman rule can still be the outcome of a 
sequential equilibrium.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have seen how the role of electronic money competition 
(and of similar ‘'money substitutes") as a disciplinary mechanism is fairly 
different depending on: the relative efficiency of financial intermediaries, 
the preferences of the government and its ability to commit, and the 
extent of reserve requirements restrictions.
The introduction of electronic money affects the returns of the profit 
maximizing government by competing away some of the monopolistic 
rents and, as a result, lowering the equilibrium inflation rates in the 
full commitment equilibrium. When there is not full commitment, the 
cost for a profit maximizing government from deviating, by defaulting on 
current cash balances (i.e., government liabilities), is simply the loss of 
future seignorage rents. The presence of electronic money does not affect 
the revenues of the government after a deviation, since the seignorage 
revenues are zero independently of whether households can or can not 
substitute currency for other liquid assets. However, with lower gains — 
due In the presence of electronic money— the relative cost of a deviation 
is also lower and, hence, higher the incentive to deviate. Nevertheless, if 
financial intermediation is costly enough, a profit maximizer government 
will not deviate from the full commitment path.
In contrast, with a “representative” government, the introduction 
of electronic money does not affect the returns of the government since, 
under full commitment, the Ramsey poliev prescription is the Friedman 
rule and electronic money is -asset return dominated by the govern­
ment currency. In our model, it follows from standard optimal taxation 
principles that the Ramsey policy is time-inconsistent. The presence of 




























































































path after a deviation. Since the government shares the preferences of 
the household, and the household is better off when it is able to consume 
cash goods with electronic money than in autarchy (and. furthermore, 
the tax base is wider), the "punishment'' after a deviation is not so se­
vere. Therefore, the incentive to deviate from the Friedman rule is higher, 
when there is electronic money. But. as we have seen, the liquidity crunch 
effect may be enough of a deterrence to prevent the "representative" gov­
ernment to deviate from the Ramsey policy even when there is electronic 
money.
In both cases, whether the government is “representative" or profit 
maximizer, if a deviation from the full commitment, solution takes place 
(because the deterrence effects are not strong enough), households are 
better off if electronic money is in existence (e.g., the relation between 
cash and credit goods is less distorted). There is. however, a region of 
parameters where deviations will take place with electronic money and 
will not take place without its presence. Only in this region may a world 
without electronic money be preferred by households.
Reserve requirements affect the competition between currency and 
electronic money. With reserve requirements the rents in the full com­
mitment solution with a revenue maximizing government are higher, and 
the costs of a deviation from the Friedman rule path with a welfare 
maximizing government are also higher. So reserve requirements make 
it easier to sustain the commitment solutions, which may result in a 
welfare improvement, when the government is revenue maximizer. Sim­
ilarly. reserve requirements can make the deviation paths more harmful 
to a "representative” government, in the presence of electronic money. 
That is, our analysis also provides prescriptions for the use of reserve 
requirements as policy instruments, even if our deterministic, perfect in­
formation, economies are absent of the problems that usually just ify their 
existence.
While this paper suggests many new inquires, there is one, in par­
ticular, that we are pursuing: the analysis of "currency competition” in 
its strict sense. With this our analysis will be in closer line with the his­




























































































provide more general insights on how competition and reputation -as 
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